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ADDRESS

TO THE

PUBLIC,

In ANSWER to

TWO PAMPHLETS,

(INTITLED,

An APPEAL to the People of ENGLAND,
and A LETTER to a Member of Par-
liament, relative to the Case of A——l
B——g)

In which is fully proved,

That the several Parts of the A——l's Letter,
omitted in the *Gazette*, were rather of Use,
than Prejudice to him.

WITH

Several other Interesting Particulars, never yet ex-
hibited to the Public.

By an ANTE ITALIANITE.

L O N D O N :

Printed for A. TYPE in Paternoster-Row. 1756.



A D E S S

P U B L I S H E R

T W O P A R T S

An A T T E M P T to
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By an A T T E M P T

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Printed for A. T. ...

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ADDRESS

TO THE

PUBLIC, &c.

HAVING heard much

H Talk of two Pamphlets

lately come out, the one

intituled, *An Appeal to the*

People of England; the other, *A Let-*

ter to a Member of Parliament, rela-

ting to the Case of A——l B——g,

thousands of which have been circu-

lated in every Part of *England* Gratis.

Curiosity led me to give them a seri-

ous reading, but must confess, with-

out finding any one Circumstance in the suppressed Parts of his Letter, about which the Partisans for the A—I make such a Fuss, that tends the least in clearing his Conduct on the Day of Action, or setting his Engagement with the *French*, the 20th of *May* in a more favourable Light ; but on the contrary proves, (as is easy to illustrate) that from his very outset, he never intended, either to relieve *M——ca*, or to fight the Enemy.

In the first Part of his Letter, omitted by the *Gazette*, he tells you, “ that being off the Lair of *M——n* ” (which is about three Leagues from *St. Philip’s*) “ and near enough to “ discover the *British* Colours flying on “ the Citadel, and the *French* in their “ Camp ; That he detached from “ his Fleet the *Phoenix*, *Chesterfield*, “ and *Dolphin*, ” (one of which, by the by, would have served) “ to re- “ connoitre the Harbour’s Mouth, “ and



“ and to carry a Letter to the General, to let him know he was there to his Assistance ; ” though he insinuates, at the same time, that for want of Troops on Board he could in Effect be of no Use, “ but the *French* Fleet just then appearing from his Mast-head, he made a Signal to call them off.”

Now let any impartial Man weigh this Paragraph coolly ; and they will plainly see from what I shall hereafter mention, that this Man had nothing less in View, than relieving the Place. From the Situation he was in, close under the Land, and the *French* in the Offing, the two Fleets were at least ten Leagues from each other, and could not possibly come to an Engagement that Night, nor did they till two o’ Clock in the Afternoon the next Day, therefore if the A——I meant honestly, why did he call off the Frigates, before they had performed

formed their Orders in delivering their Letter to the General ; as it was of the utmost Consequence, when probably an Hour more (as the Frigates must have been considerably advanced in their way to the Fort when the A——l called them off) would have effected their Designs ? especially as the Admiral knew the Frigates would be of very little Use in the Engagement, even could they have come to one that Night, or he might have called off two of the Frigates, if he thought them so necessary, (in order by Number to aim at frightening the *French*,) and let his Favourite in the *Phoenix* have proceeded with his Letter, and fulfilled such other Services as he was pretended to be sent for—— But here the A——l will tell you “ he had no Land Forces to supply “ them with : ” Was he not ordered to land the Regiment of *Fusiliers*, consisting of eight hundred and fifty Men ? and, why did he refuse the
Batta-

Battalion offered him by General F——ke at *Gibraltar*, (saying they would not be wanted) if he really intended to succour the Place? This Refusal of the Battalion added to the before-mentioned proceeding in calling off the Frigates, when perhaps in a short Hour, they might have brought on a Correspondence between the G——l and the A——l, will I hope, prove my Allegation, that the Omision of that Part of his Letter in the *Gazette*, was rather of Service than Prejudice to him.

Thus having rendered vain, by his own Mismanagement, this important Part of the Service for which he was purposely sent out, and the poor General (though the A——l saw his Garrison bombarded from several Batteries of the Enemy) unrelieved; he proceeds to inform you “that at five o’Clock
“ the same Evening he was not near
“ enough the *French* to discover any

“ more than their Numbers, but not
 “ at all their Force, so finding it im-
 “ possible to bring on an Engagement
 “ that Day, he tacked from them to
 “ be under the Land, in order to profit
 “ from the Land-wind in the Morn-
 “ ing to keep the Weather-gage. —

“ That early the next Morning they
 “ saw nothing of the Enemy, but as
 “ the Day advanced he discovered
 “ them from his Mast-head, forming
 “ their Line of Battle to leeward,
 “ having unsuccessfully endeavoured
 “ to gain the Weather-gage.” —

And here I cannot avoid observing
 how contradictory this must be to the
 A——l's Assertion “ that the *French*
 “ Fleet sailed three Feet to his one,”
 and to mean it as I shall prove, lite-
 rally so, and not as a common Sea
 Phrase; since had they only sailed
 four Foot for his three, they might
 easily have gained the Weather-gage,
 in spite of all the A——l's Endea-
 vours to prevent them. Indeed after
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the Engagement begun with the Van of our Fleet, opposed against almost all theirs; had he asserted that they went ten Feet to his one, he might perhaps have been right, since it was apparent to the whole *British* Fleet, that the *French* fought under weigh, with their three Top-sails full, whilst the whole Ships of A——l B——g's Division had theirs a-back, so that if the *French* sailed three, five, or as many Feet as they did sail, must be so many to their nothing, as he and his whole Division lay immoveable like a Log.

The next Part of his Letter omitted, “was his Inability of securing the Ships Masts at Sea, or placing his sick Men, (more than a thousand in Number,) having no Hospital-Ship for that Purpose.”——How comes it, let me ask, that in the Space of four Days such a vast Number as a thousand Men should

fall sick; we may presume that he was not in that sickly State when he attacked the *French*, at least the *Cul-loden*, out of six hundred the Day they were kept from Action, had not one sick Man on Board? May we not then suppose, that this vast Number, become sick in four Days, were only sick of the Lay, or rather that it was a plausible Pretence for not renewing, what he had never any great Stomach for, the Engagement? it being equally evident, that the damaged Ships did secure their Masts at Sea, and that they served to carry them back to *Gibraltar*.

The next Paragraph of the A——'s Letter which I shall comment on, is his Reasons for calling the Council of War, which he says was done “to consider of the then present Situation of *M——ca* and *G——er*, and to make sure of protecting the latter;” and then goes on to acquaint

quaint you “ of the vast Advantages
 “ which the *French* Fleet had over
 “ his, by getting Reinforcements of
 “ Men from their Camp, and by be-
 “ ing clean Ships that go three Feet
 “ to his one, and therefore have the
 “ Choice how they will engage him,
 “ or whether they will engage him
 “ or no ; but keep in such Position
 “ as they please, thereby damaging
 “ his Masts and Rigging.” Here you
 will observe that he makes good my
 former Plea, that he meant in a lite-
 ral, not a figurative Sense, — “ their
 “ sailing three Feet to his one,” and
 confirms my Observation, that in that
 Case, the *French* might have gained
 the Weather-gage of him, if they
 would, an Advantage they would
 scarcely have failed to make use of,
 as it would have been so eminently
 useful to them, and therefore we may
 presume they could not. But even
 this was not true, for it is known to
 all the World, that as the *British*
 Fleet

Fleet were cleaner Ships than the *French*, so they were likewise better Ships, one or two perhaps only excepted; most of the Ships of *B——g's* Squadron having cleaned in the Spring, every one of them since *Christmas*; The *French* (in order to be ready for their Expedition, and by being obliged to the tedious Method of heaving down, as they have not the Advantage of Docks) being cleaned so long ago as *October* and *November* of the last Year; and had an *A——n*, or a *B——n*, commanded that Fleet, and made the Signal (as I make no doubt they would) for chasing, and a closer Engagement, Monsieur *la Gallifsonere's* Heels would not have availed him, and that poor scurbutic Admiral would have had the Benefit at this time, of our *Bath* Waters, *Mabon* been saved, and perhaps that fine Gentleman, the *Duke de Richlieu*, like his Brother General the *Duke de Bellisle*.

Bellisle, reinstructing our fine Ladies in the Use of Pantine.

To proceed, the A—— goes on in his Letter to acquaint the A——ty that “he cannot send their Lordships
 “ the Particulars of their Loss and
 “ Damages by that Conveyance, and
 “ urging them for more Ships, as he
 “ is FEARFUL that the Enemy will
 “ soon be joined by four large Ships
 “ from *Toulon*, and that he was making the best of his Way to cover
 “ G——r.” Here the poor Gentleman forgets himself again, for you must know that he had been obliged to produce the Damages done to the Ships, and the great Number of Men killed and wounded on Board his own Division the Day before, viz. the 24th of *May*, to the Council of War, in order to induce them to favour his Scheme of covering G——r, though he prudently took care never to cover it with any Part of his Person afterwards,

wards, but then as if recollecting himself, he tells their Lordships that “ he had got the Defects made out while “ he was closing his Letter.” Who can be so ignorant as not to see that his whole Design was, if possible to conceal their Losses, knowing that those on Board his whole Division, consisting of the six best Ships in the Squadron would make a most ridiculous Figure in the Catalogue, namely, *none killed nor none wounded*, thus ends this memorable Letter, about which the Partisans for the Admiral make such a Noise, and for which they have put themselves to so unnecessary an Expence.

What relates to the Number of *French* Ships, their weight of Metal, and Number of Men, I shall not pretend to dispute; it must be confessed that a Shot of fifty-two Pounds, is heavier than one of thirty-two, and that one of twenty-four, is heavier than

than one of eighteen, and that nine hundred and fifty Men are more than seven hundred and thirty, all that is doubted is, whether the Estimate of the Force of the two Fleets be true: Indeed on the first View, to every understanding Seaman it must appear false, it being impossible for a Fifty-gun Ship, (and that the *Fier*, and *Hippotame*, are so is certain) to carry so large Metal as thirty-six Pounders on her lower, and twenty-four on her upper Deck, and eight hundred Men; no Fifty-gun Ship, in our or any Nation, being capable of containing that Number without apparent Injury to themselves, and Advantage to the Enemy.

I am sorry to say, that I have ever found these nice Calculators of Weight and Diameter of an Enemy's Shot are generally Chicken-hearted, and lose all their Courage as well as Skill on the Day of Action, an Example of

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which,

which, happened within the Compass of all our Memories in the late War, for which the Gentleman, though in his private Character a most amiable Man, no Tyrant, a Lover of the beautiful Sex, not proud when exalted, or over humble when abased, nor meanly creeping to gain the Favour of the Mob, was deservedly broke; rendered incapable, and never more employed again; though no Man (abstracted from what he suffered for) was fitter for Command, and who would now but for that very Misfortune, have been high upon the List of Admirals, yet this Man so guilty, and thought undeserving of being restored to the List from which he was expunged, has our humane and worthy Head of the A——ty (so vilified in these two Pamphlets) rescued from Want, and placed on a private List for a Captain's half Pay; and here Indignation rises at the Ingratitude of that Man, who could fly in

in the Face of his Benefactor, who generously distinguished him for his Father's Services in the *Mediterranean*, in order to gain the Son, if he would grasp at it, equal Honour, by selecting him from more worthy Men, in giving him the Command of that Fleet, which had he made a right Use of, he would have gained Title, Riches, and what is preferable to them all, the Love of his Country.

'Tis true 'twas a natural and seemingly a well judged Choice, for who could so well be pitched on to succour the Island of *M——ca*, as the Man who has lived in the *Mediterranean* great Part of his Days, and who by an Advantage of having a Pleasure-Yacht many Years in the Harbour of *Mabon*, in which he surveyed all Parts of the Island, knew every Harbour, Creek, and almost every Stone on it. Who then could be so proper in Appearance, (as 'twas impossible to know

he would not fight) to throw Succours into a Place he was so intimately acquainted with? and yet is the Person that chose him for that very Service blamed by the Vulgar and unthinking, and abused as a Man undeservedly started into Nobility, by the very Person who, had he been capable of behaving well would have reaped all the Benefit resulting from it.

How this Man thus undeservedly started into the Honours he enjoys, is not my Business in this little Work to elucidate, (my Business being only to prove in these few Pages, that the Suppression of those childish Parts of A——l B——g's Letter, were rather beneficial to him than otherwise, and this I think or hope at least, that I have sufficiently done) but if the above abusive Author would only recollect, the cool unchangeable intre-

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pid Behaviour of this Nobleman, under the most trying and daunting Circumstances, in his long Voyage to the *South Sea*, his Humanity to the Seamen under his Command, and every amiable Part of that Gentleman's Character, throughout that afflicting Trial, under which few, if any of us could have supported, but perhaps returned, as two of the best Ships of his Squadron did, without effecting their Purpose, and that the same Person gave the first decisive Stroke to the *French* naval Power, the 2d of *May*, 1747, by taking six Sail of their capital Ships of War, some *India* Men, and many of their Trade; and that by the prudent stationing of our Fleet the *October* following, we took six Sail more of their Men of War, and several more of their Line of Battle Ships were taken by our Cruizers to the total Destruction of the *French* Marine.

If we consider all these Advantages gained under his auspicious and prudent Conduct, surely we cannot think him undeserving of every Honour he has attained to? that he may long enjoy them as I believe him to be a zealous and true Friend to this Country, and that my Countrymen may be less apt from present Ills, (and that too occasioned by others) to detract from a Man's former Services, is the ardent Wish of

My Countrymen's

Most Faithful, and

Most Humble Servant,

The AUTHOR.



F I N I S.